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of competing duopoly airlines. These impacts are derived by analyzing the effects of an 
increase in the effective price of fuel, which is the path by which emissions charges will alter 
airline choices. The results show that emission charges will raise fares, reduce flight 
frequency, increase load factors, and raise aircraft fuel efficiency, while having no effect on 
aircraft size. Given that these adjustments occur in response to the treatment of an emissions 
externality that is currently unaddressed, they represent efficient changes that move society 
closer to a social optimum. 
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As concerns about global warming mount, policy makers have begun targeting emissions 
from aircraft as a means of reducing the production of greenhouse gases.  Most notably, the 
European Union starting in 2012 will require airlines to hold emission permits in order to 
operate.  Each airline must hold a number of permits commensurate with the CO2 pollution 
generated by its fleet, with permits acquired through a trading process following an initial, 
partially free distribution among the carriers.
1  This approach follows existing “cap-and-trade” 
schemes applied to polluters in the industrial and energy sectors both in Europe and in the US 
(see Forsyth, 2008, for details and further discussion). 
The planned emission trading system generates a permit price that becomes part of an 
airline’s cost structure.  With the carrier’s required outlay on emissions permits varying in step 
with its total fuel consumption, the permit price is effectively added to the price of fuel, even 
though most of the permits will be freely distributed.  Thus, the planned trading system can be 
viewed as equivalent to a carbon-tax scheme applied to aviation, which would explicitly raise the 
price of fuel.  As a result, regardless of whether policy interventions to limit aviation emissions 
follow the EU’s cap-and-trade approach or rely on taxation, they can all be depicted as policies 
                                                 
∗ We thank Michael Levine for stimulating comments.  Any errors or shortcomings in the paper, however, are our 
responsibility. 
1 As of late 2008, the EU’s intention was to freely distribute 85 percent of the total emission permits, with the 
remaining 15 percent auctioned.  Movement to a 100 percent auction system is envisioned in later years.  The permit 
distribution would cap emissions at 97 percent of the 2004-2006 level (see Wall, 2008).   2
that raise the fuel price paid by airlines.  The effects of such policies thus operate in the same 
direction as the impacts of a secular fuel-price increase unrelated to government intervention, as 
occurred through mid-2008. 
How will airlines respond to a policy-induced increase in the effective price of fuel?  
What will happen to airfares?  How will service quality, as reflected in flight frequencies and 
load factors, change?  How will aircraft design (fuel efficiency, seat capacity) evolve in response 
to changes in the derived demands of airlines as fuel prices rise?  Will the structure of airline 
networks change?  The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions.  The answers, 
which are derived from a simple theoretical model, are important since they predict the detailed 
response of a key, highly visible industry to a major government intervention in the fight against 
global warming. 
The paper builds on the approach used by Brueckner and Girvin (2008) in their analysis 
of the impact of airport noise regulation.  In the model, passengers value airline flight frequency 
and dislike high load factors because of discomfort and the higher chance of being denied 
boarding (bumped from a flight).
2  Passengers choose between two competing airlines based on 
these factors along with the fares they charge.  Each airline incurs fuel cost, which depends on 
aircraft fuel efficiency, as well as the capital cost of the aircraft in its fleet.  This latter cost 
depends on aircraft size (seating capacity) as well as fuel efficiency.  With higher efficiency 
requiring better engine technology as well as use of lighter materials, aircraft capital cost rises.  
Even though both design features (size and efficiency) are set by the manufacturer, the airline is 
portrayed as the ultimate decision-maker, with the manufacturer responding to its derived 
                                                 
2 While monetary compensation partly offsets the cost of denied boarding, some cost presumably remains for the 
typical bumped passenger.   3
demand for aircraft characteristics.
3 
A key issue in the analysis is the form of the function relating aircraft capital cost to size 
and fuel efficiency, measured as fuel consumption per seat.  While cost per seat is realistically 
assumed to fall with aircraft size holding fuel efficiency constant, the interaction between fuel 
efficiency and size in determining capital cost is less obvious a priori.  The analysis imposes a 
plausible general restriction on this interaction, which is satisfied by the specific functional form 
that is adopted to facilitate the analysis.  Although engineering data could, in principle, shed light 
on the appropriateness of the adopted functional form, available data appear not to be rich 
enough for this undertaking.
4 
The analysis in section 2 of the paper develops the model, deriving the airline profit 
function.  The key parameter in this function is the price per unit of fuel.  Section 3 analyzes the 
airline profit-maximization problem and carries out a comparative-static analysis.  The model 
solution is given by a nonlinear simultaneous equation system, but despite the system’s 
complexity, comparative-static analysis is feasible and yields determinate fuel-price impacts.   
Some of the comparative-static results are natural (for example, the fare rises with the fuel price), 
but some findings are not predictable a priori.  As a group, however, the comparative-static 
results provide important information by showing how airline emission charges (either in the 
                                                 
3 To a certain extent, airlines can also affect average aircraft characteristics through their decisions on retirement of 
the older, less fuel-efficient planes in their fleets, and through fleet deployment/operations decisions with respect to 
aircraft size.  
4 Data from the Boeing and Airbus websites (www.boeing.com and www.airbus.com) do indicate fuel-efficiency, 
measured as gallons consumed per seat mile, for various aircraft types.  The numbers are 0.0171 for a 1988-vintage 
Airbus A320, 0.0139 for a 1998-vintage Boeing 737-800, 0.0166 for a 1998-vintage Boeing 777-300, 0.0180 for a 
1995-vintage Airbus A340-600, and 0.0167 for a 2008-vintage Boeing 747-8.  The values for the large aircraft (the 
last three) are similar, while the 737-800 value, which is from a smaller aircraft of a comparable vintage, is lower.  
Discounting the A320 value (which is similar to that for the larger aircraft) as reflecting the earlier 1988 vintage, the 
numbers suggest that the chosen level of fuel-efficiency is higher for smaller aircraft.  While these numbers are 
revealing, exploring the relationship between capital cost and aircraft size and fuel efficiency would require 
additional data on aircraft selling prices.  Since sales usually occur below list prices at values that are not publicly 
revealed, acquisition of price data is problematic.  But even if such data were available, the small number of 
different existing aircraft types would probably not yield enough data points to estimate, using regression analysis, 
the desired relationship (this exercise, were it possible, would involve regressing price on fuel efficiency and size).   4
form of a price for emission permits or carbon tax) are likely to affect airline decisions.  The 
derived fare and service-quality impacts also yield an expected negative impact on passengers, 
whose utility from direct consumption falls.  This loss is ameliorated, however, by environmental 
improvements from reduced emissions, as seen in the brief efficiency analysis presented in 
section 4. 
The last part of the analysis, in section 5, investigates the effect of a higher fuel price on 
airline network structure, reflected in the choice between hub-and-spoke and fully-connected 
(point-to-point) networks.  By concentrating passengers on fewer routes, a hub-and-spoke 
network allows better exploitation of the economies from larger aircraft, but its greater trip 
circuity has an offsetting effect on costs.  The analysis investigates how this trade-off is affected 
by a higher fuel price, reaching a conclusion that is interestingly ambiguous.  Thus, according to 
the model, airline emission charges need not systematically affect current network structures.  
Section 6 offers some brief empirical evidence in support of the model’s predictions, and section 
7 presents conclusions. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a travel market connecting two cities, which is served by two competing 
airlines.  A main component of the cost of serving passengers is aircraft operating costs, which 
consist of fuel cost and the leasing (or ownership) cost of aircraft.  The fuel cost depends on 
aircraft fuel efficiency, which is measured as fuel consumption per seat per flight hour, denoted 
by the variable e.  The aircraft leasing cost per hour flown, denoted  ) , ( s e g , depends on aircraft 
seating capacity s, as well as on fuel efficiency.  Since a more fuel-efficient plane (with a lower 
e) is more expensive (requiring better engine technology, better design, and/or use of lighter 
materials), while a larger plane also costs more, g  is decreasing in e and increasing in s.    5
Economies of larger aircraft mean that  s g /  is decreasing in s, and since successive increases in 
fuel efficiency (decreases in e) are increasingly expensive, g is convex in e.  Additionally, a 
negative cross partial derivative might make sense, implying that increases in fuel efficiency are 
harder to achieve in a larger plane.  While the g function is most easily viewed as a pure capital 
cost, it could also include crew costs per hour, which depend on the size of the aircraft. 
Letting  r  denote the price per unit of fuel, the flight cost per hour is given by 
) , ( s e g res + , where the first term gives fuel cost.  Letting k  be hours per flight, the cost of one 
flight is then equal to  k s e g res )] , ( [ + .
5  With  f  flights operated and k  being an increasing 
function of distance d, the airline’s total cost is thus given by  
) ( )] , ( [ d k s e g res f + .           ( 1 )  
Expression (1) indicates that the airline’s cost depends on trip length and the number of seats per 
aircraft, two variables found by Swan and Adler (2006) to be the main factors affecting aircraft 
costs.  Swan and Adler (2006) further argue  ) (d k  is a linear function with a positive intercept, 
implying economies of “stage length” (flight distance): the cost per kilometer flown declines as 
the number of kilometers flown increases. 
The two airlines serving the market, referred to as firms 1 and 2, carry passenger volumes 
of  1 q  and  2 q , respectively.
6  Each consumer makes one trip on either airline 1 or airline 2, so 
that the total number of passengers in the market is fixed and normalized to 1 ( 1 2 1 = + q q ).  
                                                 
5 It should be noted that this cost formulation requires fuel consumption per flight hour to be independent of the 
duration of a flight.  This independence is plausible given that high fuel consumption during the take-off phase of 
the flight is offset by low consumption during the landing phase, so that average fuel consumption per hour during 
these two phases may approximately equal to consumption per hour during the longer cruise phase of the flight.  In 
this case, fuel consumption per hour may be roughly invariant to total flight duration, even though the landing and 
takeoff phases account for a smaller share of total flight hours on longer flights. 
6 Although the analysis focuses on a duopoly market, it extends immediately to the n-firm case.  With an n-firm 
oligopoly, the ½ term in traffic q (see below) is replaced by 1/n.  This change can be demonstrated by applying the 
approach of Brueckner (2008) to the current model.  For a noncompetitive alternative in developing this type of 
model, see Girvin (2008).   6
While consumers could in principle choose not to travel, making the passenger volume elastic, 
the model assumes that travel demand is strong enough to allow the no-travel option to be 
ignored.  The quantities  1 q  and  2 q  depend on the fares charged by the airlines, denoted  1 p  and 
2 p , and on the service qualities they provide.  
One element of service quality is flight frequency, which determines the “frequency 
delay” experienced by a passenger (the difference between the passenger’s preferred departure 
time and nearest flight time).  When using a particular airline, a passenger’s expected frequency 
delay is inversely proportional to the airline’s flight frequency f, assuming the passenger’s 
preferred departure times are random and uniformly distributed and that flights are equally 
spaced.
7  The passenger’s cost of frequency delay on airline i can then be written γ/fi, where γ is 
a cost parameter common to all passengers. 
Douglas and Miller (1974) argue that another type of delay, denoted “stochastic delay,” 
arises through excess demand, which may lead to denial of boarding on a flight that is oversold 
and thus an additional delay.  Stochastic delay is affected by airline’s load factor, which equals 
the percentage of its seats filled by passengers.  Following Panzar (1979), the analysis assumes 
that a passenger’s probability of being denied a seat, and hence stochastic delay, is proportional 
to an airline’s load factor, denoted li for airline i.  The cost of stochastic delay can then be written 
λli, where λ is a common cost parameter.  Gathering all these elements, the cost of flying on 
airline 1 is then the sum of the fare and the two delay costs, equal to  1 1 1 / l f p λ γ + + , with an 
analogous expression for airline 2. 
                                                 
7 Assuming flights are equally spaced over the day, represented by a circle of circumference T, and that a 
passenger’s preferred departure time is random and distributed uniformly across the circle, expected frequency delay 
equals T/4f.   7
An additional motivation for the appearance of the load factor in the passenger’s cost 
expression is possible.  While generating stochastic delay, a high load factor also imposes a cost 
on the passenger arising from aircraft crowdedness and the resulting discomfort.  This 
interpretation of the load factor’s impact will be useful in the welfare analysis presented below. 
Although passengers compare the costs of flying in choosing between airlines 1 and 2, 
brand loyalty also affects the choice, as in Brueckner and Girvin (2008).  Brand loyalty appears 
as an extra additive term in the cost expression for airline 1, which is negative for passengers 
preferring airline 1 and positive for passengers preferring airline 2.  Assuming that this brand 
loyalty term is uniformly distributed over the interval  ] , [ α α − , the number of passengers 
























,        ( 2 )  
while the demand for airline 2 is given by the analogous expression with the 1 and 2 subscripts 
interchanged (see Brueckner and Girvin (2008)).  Thus an increase in flight frequency by airline 
1 will increase its demand while reducing airline 2’s demand, and an increase in the load factor 
or the fare will have the opposite effect.  Note that, when all three variables are equal across the 
two airlines, each airline faces a demand of ½, exactly splitting the total number of passengers 
with its competitor. 
Analysis of this model using a general form for the capital cost function  ) , ( s e g  is 
inconclusive.  To generate determinate results, the capital-cost function is assumed to take the 
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where  β  and ε  are positive parameters.  The functional form in (3) satisfies all the conditions 
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Note that the equality  1 1 1 1 q l s f = , which equates total occupied seats to passengers, is used to 
eliminate  1 s  in the second line of (4).  Given this equality, only two of the variables  1 f ,  1 s  and  1 l  
can be choice variables for the airline.  As seen in (4),  1 f  and  1 l  from among this group are 
treated as the choice variables, leaving  1 s  to be deduced from the relationship  1 1 1 1 / l f q s = .  Note 
also from (4) that the carrier’s total cost has two parts: one is proportional to the number of 
passengers carried  1 q , while the other part, namely  k e f ) / ( 1 1β , does not vary with the number of 
passengers.
8 
With the model specification now clear, it is useful to explain how the imposition of 
airline emission charges can be represented by an increase in the fuel price.  As indicated in the 
introduction, the impact of emissions charges is viewed as increasing the effective price of fuel 
regardless of whether an EU-style cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax is used (a similar point is 
made by Forsyth, 2008).  To understand this claim, let x denote the number of permits required 
per unit of fuel consumed, so that the number of permits needed by an airline is given by xfsek.  
                                                 
8 It should be noted that the above formulation assumes that aircraft size and frequency can be smoothly adjusted to 
suit the size of the market.  In reality, such decisions involve indivisibilities such as minimum aircraft sizes and 
minimum viable flight frequencies, which may constrain actual choices.   9
Letting the emission permit price be denoted z and the number of permits allocated to the airline 
be denoted m, the term  ) ( m xfsek z −  would then be subtracted from profit.  This expression gives 
the outlay for the purchase of permits when the airline requires more than its allocation (when 
) m xfsek > , or the revenue from the sale of permits when the airline has more than it can use 
(when ) m xfsek < .  As can be seen by inspecting the first profit expression in (4), the fuel price 
r  would then be replaced by  zx r + , with the constant zm  also subtracted from the profit 
expression.  Similarly, with a carbon tax t per unit of fuel, the fuel price would be replaced by 
t r + .  In either case, therefore, the impact of airline emission charges may be assessed simply by 
analyzing the impact of an increase in the fuel price. 
A final point regarding the model setup concerns the assumption of a fixed total 
passenger volume ( 1 2 1 = + q q ).  Since the imposition of airline emission charges would be 
expected to reduce the total volume of air travel by increasing its cost relative to other goods, 
reliance on a model where this volume is fixed is not ideal.  However, when the current approach 
is imbedded in a model with an elastic travel demand, the complexity of the resulting framework 
makes it amenable only to numerical analysis.  Such analysis, which could adopt the elastic-
demand setup of Brueckner (2008), might be an undertaking in future research.
9  But the first 
priority is to explore a model capable of generating analytical results, and the present paper 







                                                 
9 Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) analyze a related model where the passenger volume is elastic, but Brueckner’s 
(2008) framework is more tractable. 
10 This limitation was also present in the Brueckner and Girvin’s (2008) analysis of noise mitigation policies, which 
raise the fare but leave total passenger volume unchanged in their model.   10
3. Profit Maximization and Comparative Statics  
This section analyzes the profit-maximization problem and carries out comparative-static 
analysis.  Consider the decisions faced by airline 1, which chooses  1 p ,  1 e ,  1 f  and  1 l  to maximize 
profit.  Using the profit function (4), airline 1’s first-order conditions can be written 
(suppressing, hereinafter, the d argument of k(d)): 
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The first-order conditions for airline 2 are symmetric, and the second-order condition (positive 
definiteness of the Hessian matrix of  1 π ) is assumed to hold. 
Given the symmetry of the model, the equilibrium values of  i p ,  i e ,  i f  and  i l , i = 1,2, 
will be symmetric across carriers, and each airline’s equilibrium traffic will equal ½.  Imposing 
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=            ( 1 2 )  
The equilibrium, denoted  ) , , , (
* * * * l f e p , is the solution to equations (9)-(12). 
To start the comparative-static analysis, let equation (10) be rewritten as  fl re β ε 2
2 = − .  
Squaring both sides, substituting (11) for the resulting 
2 f  and (12) for 
2 l , and rearranging, the 
equation can be rewritten as 
; 0 ) ( ) 2 (
2 4 2 = Κ − ⋅ + Κ + ⋅ − ε ε ε e r e r   , / 2 λ γβ ≡ Κ      ( 1 3 )  
where Κ  is a positive parameter.  Applying the quadratic formula (viewing e
2 as the unknown), 
the solution for e is given by 
    ( ) [] ( ) [ ] . 2 / ) 8 ( 2 2 / ) ( 4 ) 2 ( ) 2 (
2 / 1 2 / 1
2 2 2 2 * r r r r r e Κ Κ + ± Κ + = Κ − − Κ + ± Κ + = ε ε ε ε ε ε  (14) 
Equation (14) yields two positive solutions when  Κ > ε , but one positive and one complex 
solution when  Κ < ε .  In the latter case, the square root expression in the first part of (14) is 
larger than the expression prior to the ±  sign, making the entire expression (which is raised to 
the ½ power) negative.  To rule out the first multiple-solution case,  Κ < ε  is assumed to hold, so 
that the unique (real) solution is given by the last expression in (14) with a plus sign prior to the 
square root.   
Equation (14) determines equilibrium 
* e  as a function of the fuel price r  and other 
parameters ( λ β γ ε , , , ), written as  ) (
* r e  after suppressing these latter arguments.  Differentiating 









          ( 1 5 )  
Equation (15) indicates that an increase in the fuel price leads to a lower 
* e  or, equivalently, 
more fuel-efficient planes.   12
The comparative-static effects of the fuel price on the equilibrium values of the 
remaining choice variables  ) , , (
* * * l f p  are examined next.  Once  ) (
* r e  is determined, flight 
frequency, by (11) equal to  , 2 /
* * k e f β γ =  is simply a function of parameters.  Since 
* f  
increases in  ,






           ( 1 6 )  
so that an increase in the fuel price leads to a lower flight frequency. 
For the effect on the load factor, rearranging (10) yields β ε 2 / ] ) ( [
2 * * * − = e r l f .  
Differentiating this equation yields 
, 0 2
2















        ( 1 7 )  
where the second equality follows from (15).  Expanding the derivative on the left-hand side of 












,          ( 1 8 )  
using (16).  That is, an increase in the fuel price leads to a higher load factor.  Furthermore, since 






           ( 1 9 )  
so that a change in the fuel price does not affect aircraft size. 
The fare in (9) depends on the fuel price both directly and indirectly via fuel efficiency 
and the load factor.  Capturing these channels, the impact of a higher fuel price can be 
decomposed into four parts: (i) a positive direct effect (captured by the  0 /
* * > l k e  expression   13
multiplying r
*); (ii) a negative indirect effect via the use of more fuel-efficient planes, which 
which leads to fuel savings (captured by 
* /l rk  times  dr de /
* ); (iii) a positive indirect effect via 
the use of more fuel-efficient planes, which results in higher aircraft leasing cost (this effect 
operates through e
* in the denominator of the upper ratio term in (9)); and (iv) a negative indirect 
effect via a higher load factor, which leads to downward pressure on per-passenger cost (this 
effect operates through l
* in the large ratio expression in (9)).  Using (12) in (9), p
* can be 
rewritten as 
* * 2 / l p λ α + = , which allows the net effect of these four impacts to be captured 
simply through the effect of the higher fuel price on l






           (20) 
so that the two positive effects above dominate the negative effects, leading to a higher fare in 
response to an increase in the fuel price.  Summarizing the above results yields 
 
Proposition 1.  An increase in r, or an equivalent imposition of airline emissions charges, will 
lead to a higher fare, lower flight frequency, a higher load factor, more fuel-efficient aircraft, 
and an unchanged aircraft size. 
 
Given that both elements of airline service quality worsen, while the fare increases, 
passengers are unambiguously worse off following the imposition of emission charges.  In 
addition, application of the envelope theorem to the profit expression in (4) shows that airline 
profit falls in response to the imposition of charges (to the rise in r).  Environmental benefits 
from reduced emissions have not yet been considered, however, and this element will be added 
in the next section. 
A final comparative-static question concerns the effect of flight distance on the various 
choice variables, and the answers are immediate.  From (14), since e
* is independent of k, fuel   14




* are respectively increasing, decreasing and increasing in k, so that the fare and load factor 
rise, while frequency falls, when flight distance increases. Finally, from (10), 
β ε 2 / ] ) ( [
2 * * * − = e r l f  and so 
* *l f  is unaffected by flight distance. Consequently, aircraft size  
) 2 / 1 (
* * * l f s =   is unaffected by flight distance. 
 
4. Welfare Analysis 
To carry out a welfare analysis, the damage from emissions must be considered along 
with the interests of passengers and airlines.  The treatment of passenger interests in the welfare 
analysis can be greatly simplified if the costs associated with a higher load factor are attributed 
entirely to aircraft crowding and discomfort rather than to stochastic delay.  The reason is that 
incorporation of the stochastic-delay element would require a more sophisticated analysis 
involving random travel decisions.  Under this restriction, total consumer utility can be 
represented simply by consumption expenditure, equal to income minus travel costs, which are 
in turn given by the airfare plus the costs of schedule delay and crowding.  Brand loyalties also 
affect utility, but they aggregate to a constant. 
To compute social welfare W, consumer utility is added to airline profit, with emissions 
damage then subtracted.  Given symmetry and the unit mass of passengers, welfare can then be 
written as 
), 2 ( / 2 fesk l f p y W μ λ γ π − − − − + =        ( 2 1 )  
where y is passenger income and the last term represents emissions damage.  Note that 2fesk 
represents total fuel usage by the two airlines, while μ is a parameter that gives emissions 
damage per unit of fuel burned (a linear relationship is assumed for simplicity).  In the analysis 
of (21), the fare cancels since it represents a transfer between passengers and the airlines.   15
Using a related model without any environmental components, Brueckner and Flores-
Fillol (2007) show that equilibrium is efficient in a situation when all potential passengers travel, 
as in the current analysis.  Adapting this result to the present context, the implication is that if μ 
were equal to zero (eliminating any environmental concerns), then the equilibrium values of p, f, 
e, and l would maximize the welfare expression in (21).  The efficiency result in Brueckner and 
Flores-Fillol’s model disappears, however, with the introduction of a travel/no-travel margin, 
which makes the total quantity of passengers dependent on airline choices rather than fixed.  
Efficiency would similarly disappear in the present model if it were modified to allow an elastic 
travel demand, although (as explained above) this modification makes much of the analysis 
intractable. 
While equilibrium in the current fixed-passenger-volume framework is efficient when 
when μ = 0, the equilibrium is inefficient when μ > 0.  Emissions damage then arises, which 
airlines ignore in their decisions, and achievement of efficiency requires charging for this 
damage.  Given the linearity of the damage function, this charge should be set equal to μ per unit 
of fuel.  Thus, μ is the proper value for the carbon tax t.  In addition, it is easily shown that the 
endogenous emissions-permit cost per unit of fuel emerging from the trading process (zx from 
above) will also equal the damage parameter μ,  provided  that the total number of permits 
distributed to the airlines is equal to the socially optimal emissions volume from (21). 
The current situation, where airline emissions charges are absent, thus involves an 
inefficient equilibrium.  Since the effective fuel price is too low, the preceding analysis indicates 
the directions of the divergence from efficiency.  In particular, aircraft fuel efficiency is currently 
too low, flight frequency is too high, and the load factor is too low, although aircraft size is 
efficient.  Emissions charges, by increasing the effective fuel price, would correct these   16
inefficiencies by raising aircraft fuel efficiency, reducing flight frequency, and raising the load 
factor. 
 
5. The Effect of Emission Charges on Airline Networks 
This section investigates the effect of a higher fuel price on airline network structure, 
reflected in the choice between hub-and-spoke (HS) and fully-connected (FC) networks.   
Industry observers, policy makers and researchers have all speculated about the likely network 
impacts of emissions charges, making such an inquiry useful.
11  Although the analysis cannot 
explicitly identify the optimal network configuration, the discussion investigates how emissions 
charges (an increase in r) affect the relative profitability of HS and FC networks, which reveals 
the direction of the incentive to switch configurations as r rises. 
More specifically, the analysis is conducted using a three-node symmetric city layout, 
with all the links equidistant and the three city-pair markets assumed to have the same demand.
12  
The three-city system is serviced by the two competing airlines, which both use an FC network 
to serve the cities or both use an HS network (asymmetric network choices are ruled out).  Under 
the FC network, passengers in the three city-pair markets are carried by direct (nonstop) flights 
on three routes.  For a HS network, with one city serving as the hub, there are just two “spoke” 
routes, which connect the two non-hub cities to the hub.  While spoke passengers continue to 
take direct flights, passengers traveling between the two non-hub cities must take two flights and 
connect at the hub.  As a result, on a given spoke route, both local traffic and connecting traffic is 
carried.  While this higher traffic volume allows airlines to capture economies of aircraft size, 
thereby reducing costs, connecting passengers fly a longer distance than under the FC network, 
                                                 
11 For example, Albers, et al. (2009) argue that airlines may add an intermediate stop outside the EU on long 
international flights, so that the EU emissions charge only applies to the final short leg. 
12 This three-city framework has been used by, among others, Brueckner (2004), Oum, et al. (1995), Zhang (1996) 
and Pels, et al. (2000).   17
which tends to raise costs.
13  For simplicity and without loss of generality, connecting passengers 
are assumed to pay the same fare as nonstop passengers.
14 
Given this setup, FC profit is just three times the single-route profit expression from (4).  
The FC equilibrium, denoted  ) , , , ( FC FC FC FC l f e p , is then still the solution to equations (6)-(9).  
In particular,  FC e  is determined by equation (14), and  FC f  is then determined by (11),  FC l  by 
(12),  FC p  by (9), and  FC FC FC l f s 2 / 1 = . 
In the HS case, however, revenue is  pq 3 , but costs are two times (1), or 
k s e g res f )] , ( [ 2 + , given that there are only two routes under the HS network.  Furthermore, 
while the previous equality  1 1 1 1 q l s f =  applied in the FC case for airline 1,  1 1 1 1 2q l s f =  holds in the 
HS case given that each spoke route carries passengers in two markets.  As a result, HS profit for 
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That is, the HS profit equals three times a modified form of profit expression (4), where the ratio 
term involving  1 l  is multiplied by 4/3 and the last term is multiplied by 2/3. 
In the HS case, airline 1 maximizes profit (22) with respect to  1 p ,  1 e ,  1 f  and  1 l , with 
aircraft size  1 s  again the residual variable.  Imposing symmetry in the resulting first-order 
                                                 
13 The ability to exploit the economies from larger aircraft when passenger volumes increase is an important force 
behind economies of traffic density.  But, by allowing an increase in service quality, concentration of traffic in an 
HS network also affects demands in individual markets served by the network.  Specifically, higher traffic allows an 
airline to increase flight frequency, and the improved convenience raises demand.  On the other hand, higher traffic 
may allow the airline to raise its load factor, lowering per-passenger costs while at the same time reducing service 
quality, which tends to reverse the frequency-related demand increase.  All of these forces are accounted for in the 
ensuing analysis.  It should be noted that, while Oum, et al. (1995) explore the effects of these network 
complementarities on airlines’ competitive strategies in network choice, the present paper abstracts from network 
rivalry considerations.  By assuming that the two airlines either both use a FC network or both use a HS network, the 
focus is instead on the effect of emissions charges on network choice at the industry level. 
14 Without this restriction, the airlines will choose different fares for connecting and non-stop passengers.  However, 
the equilibrium solutions for the remaining choice variables are nevertheless the same as when fares are constrained 
to be equal.  Therefore, for expositional simplicity, the equal-fare assumption is imposed.   18
conditions and rearranging, the HS equilibrium, denoted  ) , , , ( HS HS HS HS l f e p , is the solution to 










































=           ( 2 6 )  
These equations differ from (9)-(12) by the appearance of the new multiplicative factors from 
(22) in the appropriate positions.  Tracing through the derivations, the new equation determining 
HS e  is 
. 0 )] 2 / ( [ )] 2 / ( 2 [
2 4 2 = Κ − ⋅ + Κ + ⋅ − ε ε ε e r e r      ( 2 7 )  
Note that (27) is the same as (13), which determines  FC e , except that the Κ  term in (14) is now 
replaced by  2 / Κ .  To again ensure a unique solution to (27),  2 / Κ < ε  is assumed to hold, 
leading to the solution
15 
() [] . 2 / ) 2 / )]( 2 / ( 8 [ ) 2 / ( 2
2 / 1
r eHS Κ Κ + + Κ + = ε ε       ( 2 8 )  
Given  HS e ,  HS f  is then determined by (25),  HS l  by (26),  HS p  by (23) and  HS HS HS l f s / 1 = . 
From (28) and (14), it is easily seen that  FC HS e e < , so that more fuel-efficient planes are 
used under the HS network than under the FC network.  The intuition behind this result is that, 
since the average passenger flies farther, greater fuel economy is preferred.  Furthermore, with 
                                                 
15 Note that this condition implies the previous condition  . K < ε    19
Κ  rising by a factor of 2 going from the HS to FC networks, it is easily seen that the e solution 
rises by less than a factor of  2 , so that  2 / < HS FC e e .
16  Thus,  
. 2 HS FC HS e e e < <           ( 2 9 )  

















         ( 3 0 )  
Thus  HS FC f f < , so that flight frequency is higher under the HS network than under the FC 
network, a result also derived by Brueckner (2004) in a related monopoly model without fuel-
efficiency and load-factor choices.  Furthermore, from (9) and (24),  
β ε 2 / ) (
2 − = FC FC FC re l f ,   . / ) (
2 β ε − = HS HS HS re l f    

















          ( 3 1 )  
where the inequality follows from (29).  Thus  FC HS s s >  holds, so that larger aircraft are 
employed under the HS network than under the FC network.  This is a sensible result, also 
derived by Brueckner (2004): by concentrating passengers on fewer routes, a HS network allows 
better exploitation of the economies from larger aircraft.  Finally, the load factor comparison 
between the two network types is ambiguous, an issue that is explored further in the appendix.  
Summarizing yields 
 
Proposition 2.  Under the assumed network structure, the HS network has more fuel-efficient 
aircraft than the FC network.  In addition, aircraft are larger and flight frequency is higher in 
the HS network than in the FC network. 
                                                 
16 Note that  2 / = HS FC e e  if and only if  0 = ε .     20
 
As indicated above, the main purpose of this section is to investigate how a higher fuel 
price affects airline network structure, which is done by examining the impact of an increase in 
r  on the HS–FC profit differential.
17  Applying the envelope theorem to (4) and (22), the 
derivative of 
FC HS



















+ −           ( 3 2 )  
An increase in r  will favor a HS (FC) network, raising (lowering) the HS–FC profit differential, 
when (32) is positive (negative).  However, the sign of this expression is ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, more fuel efficient planes are used under the HS network ( FC HS e e < ), which tends to make 
the expression positive.  On the other hand, greater trip circuity under the HS network raises 
costs relative to the FC network, as reflected in the difference between the 4 factor in the first 
term of (32) and the 3 factor in the second term.  This difference tends to make (32) negative.  In 
addition, as shown in the appendix, the load factors  HS l  and  FC l  in general take different 
values.
18 
Denoting  HS HS HS l ke F / 2 ≡  and  FC FC FC l ke F 2 / 3 ≡ , (32) is proportional to  HS FC F F − .  
However, it is easier to work with the ratio 
2 2 / FC HS F F , which is less (greater) than 1 as  HS FC F F −  



























          ( 3 3 )  
                                                 
17 Although the impact of a higher fuel price on the HS–FC profit differential is the focus of the present analysis, a 
straightforward extension shows that the same results apply to the HS–FC welfare differential. 
18  Even if the two load factors were the same, the sign of (32) would be ambiguous.  For instance, using 
HS FC e e 2 <  from (29), the sign of (32) is the same as the sign of 
] 2 ) 2 / 3 ( 2 [ ] / ) 2 / 3 ( 2 [ ) 2 / 3 ( 2 + − < + − = + − HS HS FC HS FC HS e e e e e e . 
But since the last expression is positive, the inequality does not give the sign of the first expression and hence (32).   21
Both the first and last ratio terms on the right-hand side of (33) are greater than 1, but the second 
term is less than 1.  As a consequence, the relation between 
2
HS F  and 
2
FC F  is unclear a priori.  
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;  5 . 0 0 < <θ ,   (34) 
where  Κ ≡ / ε θ .  Setting the RHS of (34) to 1 results in a unique solution of  2025 . 0 = F θ .  
Further, as depicted in Figure 1,  1 ) ( /
2 2 > < FC HS F F , as  2025 . 0 ) (> < θ .  Combining this result with 
the above analysis, therefore, an increase in r  will favor the HS (FC) network if 
2025 . 0 ) ( / > < K ε .   
Summarizing yields 
 
Proposition 3.  The imposition of emission charges (an increase in the fuel price) favors the HS 
network when the cost parameter ε is small relative to  λ γβ / 2 ≡ K , with the FC network favored 
otherwise. 
 
Rearranging the inequality in Proposition 3 shows that imposition of airline emission 
charges will favor the HS (FC) network if the cost ratio ε/β is small (large) relative to the demand 
ratio γ/λ.  Note that the inverse of the cost ratio is a measure of the economies of aircraft size 
holding e fixed, being equal to the fixed cost β/e divided by the marginal seat cost, ε/e.  Thus, 
when size economies, as measured by β/ε, are sufficiently strong (when ε/β is sufficiently small), 
an increase in the fuel price favors the HS network.  By contrast, the demand ratio γ/λ is the ratio 
of the cost of frequency delay and the cost associated with a higher load factor.  When this ratio 
is sufficiently large, an increase in the fuel price favors the FC network. 
 
 
   22
6. Empirical Evidence 
  Although a full empirical test of the model’s predictions is beyond the scope of the paper, 
Figure 2 provides some suggestive evidence supporting some of the implications of the analysis.  
The Figure shows four series over the 1993-2008 period: the aviation fuel price, revenue 
passenger kilometers (RPK) per barrel of fuel (a measure of fuel productivity), non-fuel unit cost 
(total non-fuel operating expenses divided by RPK), and the share of fuel cost in operating 
expenses.
19  The first three series are normalized by setting 1993 values equal to 100.  The 
numbers are based on aggregate data for all the world’s airlines offering scheduled services, 
provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
  The aviation fuel price series shows dramatic escalation, rising almost seven-fold over 
the period (from $16.79 per barrel in 1993 to $107.25 in 2008).  This rise contrasts with the 
slight, gradual decline in non-fuel expenses, measured on an RPK basis.  The airlines’ response 
to escalating fuel prices is documented in the remaining two series.  Fuel productivity (RPK per 
barrel of fuel) increases in step with the rising the fuel price, showing airline attempts to 
conserve fuel as it becomes more expensive.  This productivity increase presumably arises from 
two separate adjustments portrayed in the model: (i) the improving fuel efficiency of new 
aircraft, along with a shift in fleet composition toward such aircraft, and (ii) higher load factors.  
Both adjustments lead to lower fuel usage per passenger kilometer, and together, they would 
serve to moderate the price-driven increase in fuel expenses as a share of operating cost.  As can 
be seen in the fourth series, the rate of increase in this share declines after 2005, with the share 
actually falling in 2008 (from 26 percent in 2007 to 24 percent in 2008) despite the large fuel-
cost spike in that year. 
                                                 
19 The data used in generating the four series are not available for the pre-1993 years.   23
  It should be noted that imposition of emissions charges would lead to a less dramatic 
increase in the effective price of fuel than the secular increase portrayed in Figure 2.  A sense of 
the relevant magnitude can be gained using data and calculations presented by Scheelhasse and 
Grimme (2007).  Consider their numbers for the low-cost carrier Ryanair, all of whose 
operations are within the EU, making for an easy appraisal of the impact of EU-level charges.  
Assuming that the price of a pollution permit (allowing the emission of one ton of CO2) equals 
30€, Scheelhasse and Grimme’s computations show that the value of Ryanair’s required permits 
would equal 2.65€ per passenger in 2008.  Ryanair’s average fare is 44€, and assuming zero 
profit and a 25 percent fuel share in costs (using the end-of-period value from Figure 2), the 
implied fuel cost is 11€ per passenger.  Since the permit cost per passenger is 24 percent of this 
cost, emission charges can then be viewed as leading to a 24 percent increase in the effective 
price of fuel.  This increase is much smaller than the seven-fold rise over the 1993-2008 period 
but appreciable nevertheless. 
Note that, for a higher-cost carrier, this calculation would involve a higher fare but (given 
such a carrier’s higher labor costs relative to Ryanair’s) a lower fuel share in total cost.  The 
resulting effective fuel-price increase would then be similar in magnitude to the 24 percent value 
from above.  Observe also that use of a fuel cost share smaller than the assumed 25 percent value 
would raise the percentage increase in the effective fuel price associated with emissions charges.  
Such a lower fuel cost share would be appropriate if the currently low fuel price persists.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the effect of airline emissions charges on airfares, airline service 
quality, aircraft design features, and network structure, using a detailed and realistic theoretical 
model of competing duopoly airlines.  These impacts are derived by analyzing the effects of an   24
increase in the effective price of fuel, which is the path by which emissions charges will alter 
airline choices.  The results show that emission charges will raise fares, reduce flight frequency, 
increase load factors, and raise aircraft fuel efficiency, while having no effect on aircraft size.  
Given that these adjustments occur in response to the treatment of an emissions externality that is 
currently unaddressed, they represent efficient changes that move society closer to a social 
optimum. 
Although these impacts are clear-cut, the effect of emission charges on the optimal 
structure of airline networks is ambiguous.  Under some parameter values, emission charges may 
generate a shift away from current hub-and-spoke networks toward fully-connected, point-to-
point networks.  But the profitability of HS networks could be reinforced by emission charges 
under other parameter values. 
The analysis has several limitations that could be addressed in future work.  Most 
importantly, the model assumes that the total volume of airline passengers is fixed and thus 
unaffected by fuel prices and hence emission charges.  More-realistic models that use the main 
elements of the present approach but incorporate an elastic demand for travel could be analyzed, 
but the resulting increase in complexity would necessitate use of numerical methods.  The 
analysis is also based on a special, though realistic, form for the key function relating aircraft 
capital cost to seat capacity and fuel efficiency.  Since some of the results (for example, the 
invariance of aircraft size to fuel prices) may depend on use of this functional form, the effect of 
adopting other specifications should be explored, perhaps numerically. 
Airline emission charges are an important potential policy tool in the growing movement 
to address global warming, and they affect a highly visible industry that serves an important, 
affluent clientele.  As a result, analysis of the impact of emission charges on airline decisions is a   25
high-priority undertaking, and this paper has offered a first step toward filling this need.   26
Appendix 























          ( a 1 )  
While both the first and last ratio terms on the right-hand side of (a1) are greater than 1, the 
second term is less than 1 and so the relation between the load factors is unclear, a priori.  
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,   5 . 0 0 < <θ    (a2) 
Note that  5 . 0 0 < <θ  is equivalent to the earlier condition of  2 / Κ < ε .  The function in (a2) is 
depicted in Figure 3, where  1 /
2 2 = FC HS l l  for  0030 . 0 = θ .  As can be seen,  1 /
2 2 < FC HS l l  and  1 >  
for  0030 . 0 < θ  and  0030 . 0 >  respectively.  Thus, only when ε  is sufficiently small relative to 
λ γβ / 2 ≡ Κ  will the HS load factor be smaller than the FC load factor.  For most of the 
allowable range of θ, the load factor is greater under the HS network than under the FC network.   27
 
 







Figure 2: Fuel price, fuel productivity, share of fuel cost and non-fuel unit cost, 1993-2008 
 
Notes: RPK = Revenue passenger kilometers; Fuel productivity = World RPK / barrel of fuel; Share of fuel cost = % 
of fuel cost in total operating expenses; Non-fuel unit cost = Total non-fuel operating expenses / RPK; 2008F = 
forecast figures for 2008; Fuel price, fuel productivity and non-fuel unit cost are all indexed to 100 in 1993. 
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